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ABSTRACT
For decades, rhetoric has been utilized by both politicians and those in the scientific
community to convey either support for or denial of the existence of climate change. This study
combined two forms of rhetoric in the forms of both framing and politicization to determine
which form of rhetoric is most powerful in influencing a person‟s attitudes and behavioral
intentions. Pro climate change frames are expected to increase support for climate change
action, while anti climate change politicization is expected to decrease support for climate
change action. The results of this study show that select frames have the intended effect of
influence on increasing support for climate change measures. Surprisingly, the results also show
that politicization that questions the science of climate change has the power to both increase and
decrease support for attitudinal measures with regard to climate change.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1800‟s, scientists have noted that climate change may be progressing at an
accelerated rate, and that human beings may be contributing to this accelerated rate of climate
change. For those who do believe that climate change is occurring, the effects of climate change
are far reaching and are not as obvious as one would expect (i.e. increased temperatures and
accelerated evaporation of the Earth‟s water resources). Garner explains additional effects. In
what is called the
“feedback loop, the loss of ice cover reduces the ability of the Earth‟s surface to reflect
heat, thereby intensifying warming by increasing the amount of heat absorbed. The result
of rising sea levels will be flooding, initially of low-lying areas. In addition, increases in
temperatures will affect vegetation and agriculture....” (Garner 2011, 27).
Garner describes a macro level view of a few of the many effects that climate change can have
on the earth. Researchers have noted that there has already been an unexpected surge in natural
disasters over the last few decades. Many scientists attribute these surges to climate change.
“The number of significant flooding episodes has increased worldwide each decade from
6 in the 1950s to 26 in the 1990s. These floods cause high economic loss to developing
countries, loss of life, and pollution of existing water supplies. Climate change is adding
to the problem with on the one hand, heavier monsoon rain and storm surges, and on the
other hand, an increase in droughts” (Shearmand and Smith 2007, 43).
Conversations surrounding global warming or climate change1 have evolved over the
years from strictly environmental conversations into highly politicized conversations. Two
major items continue to be called into question with regard to climate change: 1. whether climate
change is occurring at an accelerated rate or is progressing naturally 2. whether climate change
has been accelerated by the actions of human beings. Since the 1990‟s the division in the
opinions and beliefs regarding climate change has formed along a several lines. The clearest line
1

Schuldt et al discuss the use of terminology on this subject. The term “climate change” is preferred, as
it is aligned with general climate changes, while “global warming” is aligned with increased temperatures
only. Both terms may be used here, as authors often use the terms interchangeably.
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of division is along that of partisanship. This is a noticeable division that has given rise to a
counter-claim that posits that climate change could actually be positive for American citizens, as
those with this stance argue that “less cold weather would mean less snow shoveling, fewer days
of driving on icy roads, lower heating bills…..The enrichment of the atmosphere with carbon
dioxide will fertilize plants and make for more vigorous [plant] growth” (McCright and Dunlap
2000, 514). While those who subscribe to this counter claim may be correct, the vast majority of
scientific research points in a different direction. Guardian notes that “[Without action being
taken scientists estimate that by 2050 there will be] about 22 million additional people at risk
from hunger because of climate change (over and above the expected because of population
change), about 23 million additional people at risk from coastal flooding, and 110 million people
living in countries with extreme water stress” (cited in Garner 2011, 27). This belief is echoed
by author James Garvey, who calls climate change “a spatially smeared out, causally jumbled,
intergenerational slow-motion disaster” (2010, 100).
Even though the debate rages, the majority of Americans believe that climate change is
occurring at an accelerated rate. According to a December 2011 survey published by the Pew
Research Center for the People and the Press, 63% of Americans polled believe that there is solid
evidence of global warming (or climate change), and 65% of those polled believe that it is either
a somewhat serious or very serious problem (Pew Research Center 2011). It is important to note
that the percentage of Americans who believe in the existence of climate change tends to change,
with many pointing to the influence of government administrations and politicians as being
highly influential in the opinions of the American public with regard to climate change (see Al
Gore‟s “An Inconvenient Truth”).
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Politicians and scientists have been able to influence citizen‟s opinions on scientific
issues through the use of politicization in both the print and visual media. The politicization of
science involves the use of science to promote a political agenda. Any conceivable issue can be
politicized, and within the scientific world everything from stem cell research to reproductive
research has been politicized. Sullivan provides a more precise definition of the term
“politicization of science”, by defining it as “instances in which the process and products of
science are interfered with for political or ideological reasons” (1996, 462).
Even though issues are frequently politicized, it could be argued that issues are framed as
often (or more often) than they are politicized. For the purpose of this research, to frame is
defined as “[to take a selection of] some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more
salient in communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition,
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman 1993, 52).
Frames are utilized in order to highlight or bring to the forefront a particular part of a subject that
the person framing the issue believes is important. Frames have the ability to have multiple
levels of framing effects. Framing effects are defined as “when, in the course of describing an
issue or event, a speaker‟s emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations causes
individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions” (Druckman 2001,
1042).
Politicization and framing are both utilized as forms of rhetoric. For the purpose of this
research, rhetoric is defined as “the art of using language effectively so as to persuade or
influence others” (Oxford English Dictionary Online). Although previous research has looked
separately at politicization and the effect of frames on opinions, it is interesting to explore what
effect the combination of frames and politicization have on opinions. This is made even more
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intriguing when the type of politicization that argues against the existence of climate change is
paired with framing that argues for the existence of/urgency of climate change. In consideration
of this pairing of two forms of rhetoric, the research question I am seeking to answer is what
effect does rhetoric in the form of both frames and politicization have on people‟s views
regarding climate change?
It is important to explore this research question because even though the majority of
Americans believe in the existence of climate change, there are still a significant number of
Republican politicians that do not believe that the issue is important. These politicians‟ opinions
are influential, not only with Republican voters, but also often with Independent voters. Those
who identify themselves as Independents continue to grow in number, so the implications could
be huge.
Even though there is currently a Democratic president in office, his Republican
predecessor effectively worked to politicize science and to weaken the voices of those in the
scientific community that subscribed to a belief in the unnatural occurrence of climate change.
There is also a substantial Republican presence in Congress. Personally subscribing to the belief
that climate change is indeed occurring at an unnatural rate acknowledges that the effects of
climate change need to be reduced as soon as possible. Climate change is a substantial issue that
should be addressed by behavioral changes at both the macro and micro level. Politicians and
scientists who believe in the existence of climate change must be able to hone in which forms of
rhetoric are most effective in order to make their cases to the American public. The most
important job at this point will be persuading those in the public who do not believe that climate
change is an issue to believe that it is indeed an important issue. This is key, as public opinion is
often the precursor to public policy.
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American politicians and scientists should specifically be concerned about this issue,
especially since “the assumption holds that climate change is caused by the increased output of
carbon dioxide....(current figures show that the United States and China have the largest output
[of carbon dioxide])” (Grotzke 2012, 22). If the United States has contributed the most to the
climate change problem, then the United States is also responsible for making a significant
contribution to the climate change solution. Climate change is an issue that has a domino effect,
so the United States‟ actions also harm less developed nations that may not have the resources
needed to mitigate the problem.
Rhetoric’s Influence on Attitude and Behavior
Rhetoric has been shown to influence attitudes, and attitudes in turn have been shown to
influence behavior. Rhetoric has been defined previously in this paper. Behavior is defined as
“the response of an individual, group, or species to its environment” (Merriam-Webster
Dictionary Online). Attitude can be defined as “these dispositions to respond with some degree
of favorableness or unfavorableness to a psychological object” (Eagly and Chaiken; Azjen and
Fishbein as cited in Azjen and Cote 2008, 289). Additionally, attitudes toward behavior are
defined as “attitudes toward performing specific behaviors with respect to an object or target”
(Ajzen and Fishbein 2005, 174).
Ajzen and Fishbein discuss how “attitudes toward the object of the behavior are assessed
in a survey or questionnaire. It is assumed that favorable attitudes predispose positive responses
to the object and unfavorable attitudes predispose negative responses” (2005, 178). Even though
it is nearly impossible to determine a person‟s future behavior, there are indicators that point
strongly toward the direction that future behavior will go in. Intentions that are expressed have a
strong correlation with future behavior, in that existing literature has found that researchers
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“should be able to predict specific behaviors with considerable accuracy from intentions to
engage in the behaviors under consideration” (Azjen and Fishbein 2005, 188). It follows that if
individuals are exposed to rhetoric, then there may possibly be a change in expressed intentions
and expressed attitudes, which in turn correlate with a change in future behavior.
Whitmarsh highlights the importance of connecting action, intent and behavior,
“Thus, there may be a tendency to overestimate one‟s contribution to mitigating climate
change, as well as to underestimate one‟s negative impact. This strategy effectively
reduces the cognitive dissonance that arises from the inconsistency between knowing
one‟s actions are environmentally damaging and not changing one‟s behavior”
(Whitmarsh 2009, 21).
In essence, what is necessary to fix the climate change issue is first the acknowledgement
that there is indeed a problem. Previous research has discovered that “[a]ccurate knowledge of
global warming is the strongest single predictor of behavioral intentions....” (Bord et al as cited
in Kellstedt et al 2008, 116). The second predictor of behavioral intention is the willingness of
the public to engage in activities that will lessen the effects of climate change, i.e. purchasing
energy efficient vehicles. Corrective action, like behavior, is also strongly associated with
attitudes. “Attitudes, values, and beliefs are also strongly associated with identification of risks
and support for corrective action” (Kellstedt et al 2008, 115).
Politicization
Even in a world where the evidence of the existence of climate change appears to be
increasing daily, the voices of those who deny either the existence of or severity of climate
change continue to emerge and receive significant press coverage, as
“a large segment of the population [is] frightened by the steady drumbeat of planetary
catastrophe, and looking to scientists and political leaders for salvation- with other
segments initiating the scare or taking advantage of it to advance their own interests and
agendas” (Driessen 2009, 773).

7
The issue is that the population‟s faith in political leaders can be misplaced, especially when
political leaders brush off or deny the mass of evidence in front of them. Author Robert Gropp
notes, “Yet with each passing year it appears that there are fewer Republican members of
Congress willing to embrace or act upon scientific knowledge, particularly when it relates to
issues such as climate change” (2011, 106).
In today‟s world of economic collapses, stock market crashes, and international conflict,
climate change falls low on the totem pole of priorities. It is critical that those who are
considered experts in their respective fields of study deliver accurate, unaltered information as
“the knowledge which [people] generate and control becomes politically important and
influential when the consensus among the epistemic community is sufficient to be convincing to
the external political community” (Paterson 1996, 136).
Hornstein notes why the politicization of science is an important issue,
“In the [past] forty years, there have been so many [episodes] in which science is said to
have been misused by policy makers that it is possible today for commentators to identify
different patterns of distortion and to argue over which pattern best captures the current
state of science-policy interaction. This argument matters because, depending on which
pattern is perceived to describe reality, entirely different narratives about regulatory
science can emerge. And these narratives in turn can lead to radically different political
perspectives for reshaping the connections between science and policy” (2006, 103-104).
In an ideal world, scientists who both believe in and deny the existence of accelerated
climate change would have the ability to conduct their research and present their research results
without any hindrances. Doremus highlights what actually occurs in the scientific world, where
“the scientific process will generate more reliable information more quickly if it is
allowed to function according to its established norms, free of external political or
financial momentum pushing toward one outcome or another….Politics must not be
allowed to obscure a scientific consensus, but equally the technical complexities of
science must not be allowed to obscure the political judgments that are ultimately at the
heart of regulatory decisions” (2006, 143).
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In reality, politics is obscuring science, and that has brought us to this discussion.
Capitalism and currency rule everything, and Michaels illustrates why scientists continue to
allow politicians and policy makers to politicize scientific data, even when the politicization may
be untrue.
“Virtually every academic researcher in the environmental sciences is supported by the
federal government….All of the imbalances that attend to a monopoly can be expected to
occur: politicization, disequilibrium between true and perceived need, and
disproportionate funding of those who express agreement with the monopoly‟s goals.
Because this monopoly is publicly funded and is administered by agencies that require
congressional oversight, there is certain to be some political bias with respect to the
programs that receive the most funding” (Michaels 1995, 51).
Politicization of climate change may take two forms: pro (those who support the belief
that unnatural, accelerated climate change is occurring) and anti (those who challenge the belief
that unnatural, accelerated climate change is occurring). This research focuses on anti-climate
change politicization. Author Kevin Armitage provides insight as to what may be the origin of
anti-climate change politicization,
“Just as consciousness of the potential importance of climate change was beginning to
rise in the late-1970s, environmentalism in the United States faced a profound backlash.
Though events such as Earth Day were crafted to avoid political affiliation,
environmentalism, with its critique of industrial modernity, skepticism of capitalist
economics, and calls for government intervention in economic activity, was often seen as
part of the political left. Environmental initiatives threatened core components of rightwing ideology such as the primacy of individual liberty, the absolute rights of private
property, free enterprise and laissez-faire government. Right-wing think-tanks and media
outlets thus began a relentless public relations campaign that attacked environmentalism
as alarmist or worse” (Armitage 2005, 419).
The use of anti-climate change politicization is no accident, and the politicization has
been used in a precise manner. “Right-wing politicians and think tanks have used the legacy of
climate research strategically to deny the current crisis by falsely depicting greenhouse science
as uncertain and contradictory” (Armitage 2005, 417). One wonders what could be gained from
denying the existence of climate change. A possible reason for this denial is that funds allocated
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for climate research could be reduced and ultimately directed to other projects that those who
subscribe to anti-climate change politicization deem worthy.
Unsurprisingly, the Republican party has frequently utilized anti climate change
politicization in various forms of discourse, including speeches. Republican Senator James
Inhofe told the senate floor that “man-induced [climate change] is an article of religious
faith....the debate over global warming is predicated on fear, rather than science....[global
warming is] the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people” (Inhofe as cited in
Armitage 2005, 417). Senator Inhofe‟s statement is the very basis for the anti-climate change
politicization utilized in this research study.
Journalists contribute to “right wing” politicization also. Media consultant Frank Luntz
“advised Republicans to underscore „your commitment to sound science‟. Luntz
suggested that politicians emphasize how „the scientific debate‟ about global warming
„remains open‟. According to Luntz, „there is still a window of opportunity to challenge
the science‟ and thus not commit to regulations” (Environmental Working Group as cited
in Armitage 2005, 425).
The tactic of arguing that the debate “remains open” lends a level of ambiguity to the issue.
Political candidates can continue to be vague if they are ever called on the carpet about this issue.
Luntz‟s statement also highlights another reason that politicians may deny climate change,
because it keeps politicians from needing to make a commitment to regulatory measures.
Framing
Existing literature has shown that the way an issue or event is framed can significantly
affect attitudes regarding that issue or event. Chong and Druckman demonstrate how a
controversial art exhibit in New York City was simultaneously framed as both “the artist‟s right
to free speech versus the right of the government to control its public finances and tax dollars”
(2001, 100). The citizens of New York City reacted very differently to the same exhibit,
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depending on which frame was used to highlight the exhibit. This example of utilizing various
frames for the same topic can be also applied to a variety of other subjects, including climate
science. Additionally, when multiple frames are used some frames are considered “stronger”
than other frames. Chong and Druckman “define a frame‟s strength as increasing with the given
persuasiveness of a given frame. Weak frames are typically seen as unpersuasive, whereas
strong frames are more compelling” (2001, 103). Based on Chong and Druckman‟s research,
politicians and scientists will want to select frames that have been traditionally shown to be
strong when they are making their cases regarding climate change.
The framing of climate change has a clear history within the American government,
specifically within Republican administrations. Cass notes how the Reagan administration
responded. With regard to climate change,
“[American] public awareness increased rapidly during the 1980‟s....In response to
growing interest, the Reagan administration advocated the continued study of climate
change, but it consistently rejected calls for a policy response as premature....The Reagan
administration framed climate change as a scientifically uncertain problem that required
additional study” (Cass 2006, 32-33).
This frame of uncertainty was effective in diverting focus away from the subject matter, as much
of the debate regarding climate change did not reemerge until the 1990‟s. Reagan‟s successor
Bush did very little to advance the conversation regarding climate change. Shabecoff notes
questionable testimony during the first Bush administration that further emphasized what would
become a partisan divide,
“A May 1989 dispute over the testimony of NASA scientist James Hansen provided
insight into the growing conflict within the Bush administration. Following Hansen‟s
testimony before a Senate committee, it was revealed the Office of Management and
Budget had changed his testimony to make the prospects of climate change appear more
uncertain” (cited in Cass 2006, 34).

11
So not only did the uncertain frame around climate change thrive, but the Bush administration
also introduced full out deception surrounding the climate change debate.
The second Bush administration brought even more bias against the existence of climate
change, as Shearman and Smith note that
“[George W. Bush] was an oil man who appointed oil men to his cabinet and was heavily
indebted to them for political donations....Bush questioned the scientific evidence of
warming and said that Kyoto was unfair and too expensive for the U.S. economy....In
effect Bush made the decision to increase his dependence on oil” (Shearman and Smith
2007, 27-28).
Apparently Bush‟s Vice President was in full agreement with the administration‟s stance on
climate change. Pitt notes that
“The oil economy and the freedoms of neoliberalism have created a philosophy of
conquistadorial destruction of the environment, encapsulated in words attributed to Vice
President Cheney that it is the God-given right of every American to consume as much
cheap gas as they can while driving the largest SUVs they can find” (cited in Shearman
and Smith 2007, 29).
Shearman and Smith highlight another reason why Republican administrations would deny the
existence of climate change, financial gain. The second Bush administration had no problem
making climate change a lesser issue, because it was in the Bush‟s administration‟s best interest
to place financial contributions over the possible huge implications of climate change. The
behavior of both Bush administrations confirms Henson‟s thoughts about the overall political
history regarding climate change, as “certain conservative governments were doing their best to
stop- or at least slow- the research and views flowing from their own scientists to the public”
(2006, 254).
Numerous frames can be selected to highlight specific portions of the climate change
debate. Taking into account Chong and Druckman‟s research regarding frame strength, I have
selected 3 relatively strong frames: a public health frame, a morality frame, and a national
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security frame. Each frame highlights a different portion of the possible, anticipated effects of
accelerated climate change. The perceived strength of the public health frame lies in the fact that
it is tied to both individual quality of life and the quality of the lives of other people. The
strength of the morality frame lies in the fact that there are concerns about the type of world that
future generations must live in. The concept is that those currently inhabiting the Earth must
properly care for the Earth so that future generations will not be adversely impacted. The
national security frame‟s strength lies in its breadth. The theory behind the national security
frame is that effects of climate change will ultimately result in mass panic that will cause mass
migration to the extent to which security in the form of the military will need to intervene.
McDonagh illustrates why the frames that were used were selected and why they are important:
“Climate scientists warn us that the decisions of this generation over the next 20 years
will have an impact upon the future of humanity. For the peoples of the Pacific, climate
change is already among the most urgent threats facing them. Rising temperatures and
sea levels, and the greater intensity of storms and natural disasters, are already affecting
the food and water supply for people in low-lying islands in different parts of the Pacific
” (2006, 183).
Additionally, citizens must realize that even small actions do add up to create an impact on
Earth‟s environment. McDonagh continues,
“Individual acts of selfishness can create a society characterized by a desire for short term
gain and immediate gratification over longer term needs and a wider view….In response,
both individual and collective acts of selflessness are needed, of self-sacrifice for the
greater good, of self denial in the midst of convenient choices, of choosing simpler
lifestyles in the midst of a consumer society” (2006, 183).
This call for self-denial ties into collective action. Each person must do his or her individual part
to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change, and it is important to explore the 3 individual
frames to further discover how each frame could be persuasive in convincing the public of the
existence of climate change. It is equally important to review the existing literature around each
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frame in order to show the information that helped to form the hypotheses surrounding these
frames.
Public Health Frame
Nisbet furthers Chong and Druckman‟s research regarding the varying strengths of
frames. Nisbet found support in his research with Maibach for the strength of public health
frames when he noticed “that even Americans who tend to discount climate change or are
ambivalent about its relevance react favorably when the issue is re-framed in the context of
public health” (2010). This is the grounding in the strength of the public health frame. While
some frames will highlight issues that may effect only select members of a population, health is a
topic that is consistently important both individually and collectively.
There are several adverse health effects that are anticipated as a result of climate change.
O‟Neill notes that there will be both direct and indirect effects of climate change on public
health, including “changes in infectious disease epidemiology, particularly increases in the
spread and activity of a variety of vector-borne diseases, [and] disruption of [the] freshwater
supply, and perhaps sanitation, because of altered precipitation patterns and sea level rise” (2001,
166). Additionally, “rainfall not only provides the medium for the aquatic stages of the malarial
mosquito‟s life cycle, but also may increase the relative humidity and hence increase the
longevity of the adult mosquito” (Martens 1998, 45). So the life cycle of disease carrying insect
will be extended. This increase of disease transmission could lead to increase death rates.
Additionally, the other major effect that is anticipated with regard to climate change is an
adverse effect on agriculture.
“[F]ood scarcity can lead to death from infectious diseases that the body is too weak to
resist....Climate change is likely to affect nearly all natural systems and biogeochemical
cycles that affect agriculture; as a result, agriculture is the sector placed most directly at
risk by climate change.... Expected effects include greater frequency of climatic
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extremes, warming in high latitudes, possible changes in monsoon rainfall, and reduced
soil water availability” (O‟Neill 2001, 144, 146).
On the one hand, we have death as a result of increased disease. On the other hand, we have the
reduced ability to cultivate food for an ever-growing population. Which is the lesser of the two
evils?
A consistent theme throughout existing literature is the fact that climate change will not
affect all nations the same way. Nations that do not have vast financial resources on hand are
unfortunately expected to suffer more than wealthier nations, because in poorer areas,
“where populations are more vulnerable, (both socially and biologically) and where
public health spending is limited by available resources, mortality and morbidity
conditions are likely to worsen as a result of global warming.....health conditions are
likely to be worse than they would have been in the absence of climate change” (O‟Neill
2001, 165).
A surprising revelation from the public health frame is the relationship between
temperature and cardiovascular health. Existing research shows that even moderate climate
change will even be bad for your heart.
“The relationship between warmth (temperature equal to or higher than 16.5° C) and
mortality from respiratory disease is greater than that from cardiovascular diseases, and
patients with less severe respiratory disease are also at risk....Not only heat, but also
moderately high temperatures are related to mortality rates.... Temperatures exceeding the
comfortable [temperature] limits, both in the cold and warm range, substantially increase
the risk of (predominantly cardiopulmonary) deaths” (Martens 1998, 113, 105).
When the numbers of people with existing cardiac issues are considered in the United States
alone, this finding is striking. When the number of people in other nations that could be affected
is considered, this news is alarming. Keatinge et al and Pan provide more insight on the
correlation between temperature and cardiac health.
“Several mechanisms may explain this increase mortality: increased blood pressure,
blood viscosity, and heart rate, associate with physiological adjustment to cold and
warmth, may explain the temperature-induced mortality of diseases of the cardiovascular
system” (as cited in Martens 1998, 105).
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Keatinge et al and Pan highlight how even those who do not have existing cardiac ailments will
still be vulnerable to the adverse cardiac effects of climate change. This puts the entire human
population, including those who are at peak health, at risk of declined health as a result of
climate change.
Morality Frame
Author Lorraine Whitmarsh discovered while conducting her research that “self-reported
motivations and correlates of intent-oriented action....[are] related principally to moral
considerations....” (Whitmarsh 2009, 19). It follows that if individuals are exposed to rhetoric,
then there may possibly be a change in expressed intentions and expressed attitudes, which in
turn correlate with a change in future behavior. Following Whitmarsh‟s research, if a morality
element is included within rhetoric, then rhetoric should be even more persuasive than it would
have been without the morality element.
With regard to the morality frame, the first battle in the war is convincing people that
their individual actions make a difference, as some people feel that “my actions will therefore
make no difference to the causation of climate change because even if I abstain from an action
that emits greenhouse gases, someone else will certainly use that fossil fuel instead of me”
(Caney and Bell 2011, 307). If people feel that their actions do not really matter, then they will
never be convinced to make changes. The morality frame hinges on the belief that individual
actions do make a difference, and collective action makes an even greater impact. Author Heinz
Grotzke notes that what is even more impactful besides changing the beliefs of the public is
changing the thoughts and beliefs of decision makers.
“[The thought process of people in power] needs to be drastically changed, and their
actions [need] to be governed by morality and wisdom. Blaming carbon dioxide alone
for what is happening is too simple....It is, however, true that each individual person,
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through his or her actions and deeds, carries full responsibility for his or her fellow
humans and for the entire earth. The question becomes the extent to which the decisions
are in harmony with nature and with human moral laws and are not motivated by egoistic
desires” (Grotzke 2012, 24).
The morality frame also hinges on the concept that “the universe, planet Earth and all life on it
are seen as creations which all have an intrinsic value” (Wolf and Gjerris 2009, 119). Viewing
this through the lens of climate change and considering the value of Earth‟s resources,
“The ultimate effects of climate change on socioeconomic or ecological systems will
depend on three broad factors: the characteristics of change in climate, the sensitivity of
the system to a given change, and the capacity of the system to adapt to climate change.
The vulnerability of a particular society is general defined by the combination of
sensitivity and adaptability. Those societies or sectors that are especially sensitive or are
least able to adapt are the most vulnerable” (O‟Neill 2001, 25).
This is key, as many nations are not financially in place or do not have the infrastructure to
effectively tackle the adverse effects of climate change. As with the public health frame, in the
morality frame financial resources and preparedness ensure that nations will be unequally
impacted. Researchers have noted that this puts wealthier nations in the place of being
responsible for solving the bulk of the climate change issue.
“Some countries on the planet- the richer, more developed, industrialized ones- have used
up more than a fair share of the [planet‟s carbon-absorbing] sinks and therefore caused
more of the suffering which is underway and on the cards.... The USA, with less than 5%
of the world‟s population, is responsible for an enormous share of carbon dioxide
emissions by country each year: about 20% of the global total....The US therefore has
perhaps the largest obligation to do something....one would quickly be drawn to the
conclusion that the rich countries have a moral obligation to reduce emissions” (Garvey
2010, 97).
In addition to tying the actions of developed nations to the impact on less developed
nations, a second aspect of the morality frame involves the responsibility that the current human
population has to leave the Earth in a livable condition for future generations. As Grotzke states,
“Trying to reduce CO2 for climate change around the world now will not bring about a
fast end to climate change. The responsible people must change their attitudes and
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thinking and acknowledge the fact that the earth is an organism and, as such, has to be
cared for in order to recover again for future generations” (2012, 22).
This research explores this aspect of the morality frame, the one that involves looking ahead to
imagine the type of natural resources that will be left for our children and grandchildren. Wolf
and Gjerris provide an example of this aspect of the morality frame,
“Some people refer to the fact that....the Earth is only on loan from God, which means
that man is obliged to look after it as God‟s creation and treat it responsibly....If we take
no action in the face of the climate problem, we increase the harm done to our global
neighbors....It is the rich nations such as the USA, which have a special moral obligation
to act since they are mainly responsible for the problem and thus should do the most to
mitigate the consequences” (Wolf and Gjerris 209, 120).
A great overall representation of climate change framed as a moral issue is a statement
from author James Mastaler. He writes, “global climate change is not only the largest moral
issue of our time, as Al Gore has notoriously opined in his documentary An Inconvenient Truth,
it is also one of the largest social injustices of our time” (2011, 67).
National Security Frame
For the purpose of this research, a national security threat is defined as “a drastic event
that occurs in a brief span of time, degrades our quality of life & narrows the range of policy
choices available” (Ullman 1983). Besides its subject matter, what primarily sets the national
security frame apart from the other two frames is the fact that the national security frame focuses
on a longer-term consequence as a result of climate change. National security would be
threatened only after other events such as natural disasters had already occurred.
“Floods, being acute events, are much more likely to provoke population dislocation.
Displaced populations are likely to reestablish themselves once the waters recede. Thus,
while floods are more likely to produce environmental refugees than are droughts, these
persons‟ status as refugees will not necessarily be permanent or even long term.
Although droughts cause less dislocation in the near term, they can cause more
significant long-term social change because of their persistence” (O‟Neill 2001, 174175).
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Here again is a contest of the lesser of two evils: floods vs. droughts. O‟Neill also introduces the
term “environmental refugees” into the discussion. These “refugees” are expected to migrate
long distances into other nations that are already inhabited. There is also an expectation that
many of the “refugees” will be citizens of the “Global South” (poorer, less developed nations)
that will migrate (as much as transportation allows) into areas considered the “Global North”
(wealthier, more developed nations).
“[E]conomic migrants tend to move from either South to North, from East to West, or
into regional immigration poles.....Unimpeded, labor will flow from the low-wage, laborabundant region....to the high-wage, capital-abundant region, while capital will flow in
the opposite direction. The problem is that within each region there are winners and
losers: the scarce factor of production loses and the abundant factor wins” (O‟Neill 2001,
177).
The influx of people will also possibly add stress to existing aspects of a nation‟s economy.
O‟Neill continues by breaking down additional problems that this large influx of people can
cause if the Global North chooses to take a “destructive” reaction,
“If the current research which assigns the most serious agricultural and health impacts to
developing countries is correct, under conditions of global climate change there will be
increased South-North migratory pressures....The North‟s adjustment to these pressures,
as in many of the other areas explored, can be either constructive or destructive. In the
latter case, immigration policy will remain essentially ad hoc and inequitable, in which
case the inevitable confusion is likely to bring about an increase in the number of illegal
immigrants. Newcomers will not be integrated into host societies, and broader domestic
policies relating to problems such as structural unemployment will not be implemented,
resulting in xenophobia and resentment” (O‟Neill 2001, 177-178).
The lack of integration of immigrants is a set up for disaster, as the resentment can trickle down
into every aspect of the immigrant‟s daily lives. Violent riots can arise from either the original
inhabitants of the nation or the un-integrated immigrant population. Then, the government
involves their police force in the conflict. Detraz explains, “[n]orthern states have issue[d]
policy documents outlining how climate change presents a security threat in which their
militaries will likely be involved. Northern states refer to climate change as a „threat
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multiplier‟....[Health related complications] are predicted to hit areas in the global South
particularly hard, but Northern states will not be immune to the impacts” (Detraz 2011, 111,
113). Involving the military means that the situation has reached a critical point. This is why it
is imperative that the climate change situation never gets to this point.
Author Richard Matthew breaks down the national security frame into 3 areas:
“[C]hallenges to national security can be organized into three groupings: anything that
weakens the elements of national power; contributes to state failure; or leads to, supports,
or amplifies the causes of violent conflict. Climate change has the potential to have a
negative impact in each of these domains....An increase in costly and hard-to-manage
events such as floods, droughts....pandemics and crop failures would probably be an
enormous additional burden on these countries, introducing a daunting new layer of
developmental challenges and hence weakening a central element of national power”
(2011, 55).
Matthew‟s description encompasses a larger overview of the possible implications of climate
change. Similar to O‟Neill‟s viewpoint, Matthew envisions a post climate change world that
does not exist in much harmony,
“Under conditions of either abrupt of incremental change, people may be displaced into
marginal lands or unwelcoming communities, enticed by extremist ideology, compelled
to resort to crime in order to survive, or take up arms, all of which risk overtaxing the
government, deepening social divisions, and breeding distrust and anger in the civilian
population....One can easily imagine such stress becoming implicated in violent conflict
and other forms of social disruption” (Matthew 2011, 55-56).
Existing literature argues for increasing support for the use of the national security frame
for climate change. Author Nicole Detraz argues for the use of national security wording.
“This is why making strategic linkages between climate change and security should not
be undertaken lightly. It is clear that actors can frame climate change as a security issue
for strategic purposes. However, it is important to consider the different outcomes that
can emerge from using one discourse over another....Specifically, I argue that using an
environmental security discourse, primarily framing climate change as a threat to human
security, is the best option for creating policies designed to address human vulnerability
to a changing climate” (2011, 116, 105).
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One plausible reason for Detraz‟s position regarding the climate change frame is the fact that
security is something that politicians are specifically concerned about, regardless of their
political ideology or partisanship. When an issue calls for the involvement of a nation‟s military,
an issue that previously seemed trivial takes on new levels of significance. Detraz also notes the
history of the climate change/national security connection,
“The links between climate change and security are not necessarily new. Indeed, in June
1988 the first major global conference on climate change, held in Toronto, was entitled
“The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security”. The conference
documents list a number of ways that climate change may negatively impact humans and
the globe, including by: .....diminishing global food security [and] increasing political
instability....” (2011, 108)
Of the three frames, the national security frame is the frame that has been explored the
least. With the exception of Detraz‟s note of the mention of the initial use of national security as
a frame in 1988, there seems to have been reluctance in most scientists and politicians to use this
frame. In one existing example of politicians stressing the importance of linking security to
climate change via the national security frame,
“....then US Senator Al Gore argued that „[a]s a nation and a government, we must see
that America‟s future is inextricably tied to the fate of the globe. In effect, the
environment is becoming a matter of national security- an issue that directly and
imminently menaces the interests of the state of the welfare of the people‟” (Detraz 2011,
108).
National security can indeed be an effective frame, especially when the outcomes mentioned in
previous literature are conveyed to the public. The issue is, with the exception of Senator Gore‟s
discourse and occasional discourse from the Obama administration on the topic, the national
security frame has rarely been used to influence the opinion of the general public.
Research- Independent Variables
This research involves embedding each of the three frames into surveys about attitudes
and behavior related to climate change measures. The frames themselves serve as independent
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variables. Additionally, there are other variables that existing literature shows may affect the
way that respondents respond when exposed to the three different frames. What follows is a
discussion of some of those additional variables.
Political Party and Political Ideology
As previously stated, many Democrats and Republicans have made their stances clear on
the issue of climate change. With regard to climate change, often the stances of Democrats align
with the stances of those within the liberal ideology, while those in the Republican party take
stances that often align with the conservative ideology. The expectation is that survey
respondents will answer survey questions similar to what existing research has reported for their
political party/ideology. Research has shown that “democrats and persons of liberal ideology are
more likely to regard climate change as risky, and are more likely to support costly risk
mitigation public policies” (Zahran et al as cite in Kellstedt et al 2008, 115).
When incorporating the often overlooked opinions of the growing number of American
voters that identify themselves as Independent, Borick and Rabe discovered that “both
Democrats and Independents are significantly more likely than Republicans to believe that the
average temperature on Earth is getting warmer, with members of the GOP nearly 30 percent
more likely than Democrats to believe that global warming is not occurring” (2010, 783). While
Independents have the option of aligning with either the Democratic, liberal view or with the
Republican, conservative view, based on Borick and Rabe‟s research, the expectation will be that
those who self identify as Independent will align with Democratic voters for the purpose of this
research.
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Race and Gender
Previous research on the effect of both race and gender on global warming concerns show
that race and gender are both of importance regarding attitudes and opinions regarding climate
change. Brody et al discovered that “white respondents are significantly less ready to alter their
lifestyle to address climate change than non-white respondents” (2012, 12). Based on this, one
would expect all of the other races and ethnicities to show an increased responsiveness to
mitigating the adverse effects of climate change. Along a similar trajectory, Borick and Rabe‟s
research observations found that “being younger, college educated, a female, and of a minority
race marginally increases the likelihood that an American will believe that temperatures on Earth
are increasing” (Borick and Rabe 2010, 783-784). So now it is also expected that women will
reflect increased support for actions regarding climate change when compared to men.
Interestingly, previous research has also found that women‟s opinions are more susceptible to
allowing external forces to change their opinions regarding climate change. In one exploratory
study, Borick and Rabe found that ”[g]ender had a statistically significant effect on five factors,
with women more likely than men to report that warm local temperatures, hurricanes, declining
[numbers of] polar bears, the Gore documentary, and droughts have increased their belief in
global warming” (Borick and Rabe 2010, 790).
Trust in People and Government
Trust in people is an interesting variable to study because the results of this research are
based not only on rhetoric, but also on how individuals process that rhetoric. Whether people
accept the rhetoric as fact, fiction, or ramblings can hinge on how much that individual feels
that he or she can trust the individual or individuals conveying the information. This applies to
every individual on this planet, and applies even more so to those in government and in the
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scientific community, as the decisions made in the political and scientific world can have
important, far-reaching implications for the entire populace. Marty illustrates this point,
“While most discussions of mistrust of distrust and trust involve trained and professional
elites, such as doctors, lawyers, ministers, teachers, or diplomats, every member of the
public is engaged in daily negotiations and experiences that concern trust. „We‟ the
public outnumber the members of those elite professions by thousands to one, so we are
often affected when trust is broken or when it is kept, when it is fragile or when it is firm”
(Marty 2010, 161).
As Marty points out, even though the general populace has strength in numbers, those in
government, though fewer in number, are able to do the most harm if the public discovers that
trust in them is not warranted.
Importance of Religious Faith and Christianity
The inclusion of religion as an independent variable may be surprising to some. Existing
literature has shown that religion does indeed have a distinct relationship to views on climate
change. These views vary, so the importance of religious faith is anticipated to be an important
variable that will effect survey responses in differing ways. Mastaler notes the evolving
relationship between religion and climate change,
“Though some in the faith community cling to the notion that climate change is a myth,
those voices are quickly becoming weaker and fewer. Meanwhile, Christian ministers
like Jim Ball are standing alongside Jews and Muslims and others in the collective moral
call to create and pursue solutions to climate change” (Mastaler 2011, 67).
This collective agreement on the issue of climate change bodes well for those scientists and
politicians whose voices may have previously been drowned out by conservative administrations.
It is even more striking that members of completely different religious faiths are able to find
common ground on such an important issue.
Two distinct groups have emerged from the community of faith, one group known as
“earthy evangelicals” versus another group known as conservatives.
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“The earthy evangelicals [also known as the activists] and the conservatives come to their
vastly different perspectives from a similar starting point. Both subscribe to the Biblical
view of humans as stewards of Earth. Both express concerns over the fate of Earth‟s
poorest residents, especially in the developing world....The activists note that „millions of
people could die in this century because of climate change, most of them our poorest
global neighbors‟, while the rival group claims that the money presumably required to
reduce greenhouse emissions could lift millions out of poverty” (Henson 2006, 256).
So the two groups diverge along the proper allocation of financial resources. Henson makes note
of the assumptions that both groups make,
“Of course, this presumes that a giant pot of money is at hand, ready to be spent on either
climate-change protection or poverty relief. In truth, of course, policymakers seldom put
such big goals side by side in setting budgets. Indeed it could end up being the risk to the
world‟s biggest economies, rather than its poorest people that motivates real action on
climate change” (2006, 256).
Henson‟s stance on this issue is probably the most feasible of all possibilities. Ultimately, the
decision of major powers to help mitigate the effects of climate change may not be an altruistic
decision, but may be a decision of self-preservation.
An additional, interesting viewpoint that has emerged from the religious community
comes from those who are part of the Interfaith Stewardship Alliance (ISA) who
“believe that larger homes, greater consumption, and general material prosperity are a
reflection of [the] progress [toward perfection]. In addition, those with this perspective
believe that the earth cannot be hurt. God‟s design of creation has positive and negative
feedback mechanisms that minimize or quickly repair environmental damage, so
increased consumption does not hurt the earth” (Curry 2008, 159).
Republican Representative John Shimkus has a view similar to the ISA standpoint in that
Shimkus “has used religion to argue against government action on climate change. „The Earth
will end only when God declares it‟s time to be over....Man will not destroy this Earth‟” (Gropp
2011, 106). The ISA standpoint is the antithesis of the earthy evangelical standpoint. The ISA
view is even more extreme than the conservative view, because not only does the ISA viewpoint
believe that climate change is not a problem, this stance also argues that God has created a world
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that will heal itself. Unfortunately, the sharp increase in natural disasters in recent years appears
to discredit the ISA view.
The majority of research on the correlation between climate change and religion has
focused specifically on the Christian religion. McDonagh illustrates the connection,
“….these reflections flow from the basic tenets of the Christian faith. This includes
God‟s love and concern for creation and the poor of the earth....[For Christians],
[h]umans are now called to bioresponsibility” (2006, 156, 174). This bioresponsibility
denotes that Christians should feel that it is up to them to care for the poor and to
maintain the resources of Earth which allow the poor to survive. Christianity is often
intertwined with the morality frame, as “Christian moral convictions demand our
response to the climate change problem” (cited in Henson 2006, 256).
Based on this, there is an expectation that those who self identify as Christian will show a
significant increase in attitudinal measures that denote support for future action on climate
change if they are exposed to the morality frame, as the morality frame hinges on the very core
of the Christian faith.
Research- Dependent Variables
To test the effects of the three frames (and other pertinent independent variables), each
survey includes an identical set of questions asking respondents about their attitudes, behaviors,
and intention regarding climate change. The responses to these survey questions serve as the
dependent variables in this research study. It is important to explore some of those dependent
variables to discuss how existing literature sets the stage for this research.
Climate Change- Is it Occurring?
It is important to note that even with the partisan divide on the climate change issue, there
are still a few Republicans that do believe in the existence of climate change and believe that
climate change is indeed an issue. Even when looking at the minority of Republicans that do
believe in the existence of climate change,
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“Democrats are much more likely than Republicans to claim that their acceptance of
global warming was affected by most forms of evidence that were not produced through
their own observations (e.g., declining polar ice and species), but when it comes to
personal experiences with weather changes (e.g., warmer temperatures), Republicans are
as likely as Democrats to attribute their beliefs in global warming to changes that they
have personally observed. This reliance on personal observations among Republicans is
consistent with their substantial skepticism regarding the way that global warming is
projected by both the media and the scientific community” (Borick and Rabe 2010, 796797).
Interestingly, Schuldt et al found that
“Republican respondents were more skeptical that global climate change is a real
phenomenon when an otherwise identical question was worded in terms of “global
warming” rather than “climate change”; no other political group (Democrats,
Independents, and Others) was significantly affected by question wording....whereas a
majority of Republican respondents (56.0%) doubted the existence of “global warming”,
a majority of Republicans (60.2%) also endorsed that “climate change” was real” (2011,
122).
This is a bizarre yet intriguing finding. If the same exact information can be presented in a
slightly different way and accepted when the information was originally rejected, then this
highlights the power of rhetoric. Even with this research, it is anticipated that the question as to
whether global warming is happening or not will be affected by the independent variables
previously discussed.
The media has also been instrumental in the climate change debate. There is such a mass
of scientific research and information, and often scientific results may be conflicting. Someone
or some group of people has to take on the role of sifting through all of that information to
deliver what is deemed both believable and important. As the media takes on this key role, they
have the opportunity to steer the public toward the direction of believing climate change is
occurring. Bannon et al have noted,
“The impetus for a meaningful US climate policy is growing....This has been reflected in
greatly heightened attention by the news media. The overall result is that a large and
growing share of the US population now believes that government action is warranted”
(as cited in Stavins 2009, 197).
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Just as the media can support the existence of climate change, the same media can also
doubt the existence of climate change. Whether climate change is occurring or not is an
important dependent variable because it will create a gauge that tells whether the independent
variables, specifically the rhetoric included in the three frames of public health, morality and
national security or the rhetoric of politicization, are able to effectively change individual‟s
attitudes and beliefs regarding climate change.
Climate Change- Causes
An area in which even those individuals who believe in the existence of climate change
are often divided on is what exactly is causing climate change, and whether climate change is
progressing based on natural means or due to human involvement.
“As with overall belief in global warming, there is also a substantial partisan gap in terms
of perceptions of its causes among individuals who believe that the planet is warming.
Republicans are over twice as likely as either Democrats or Independents to attribute
climate change completely to natural patterns” (Borick and Rabe 2010, 783).
Again, it is expected that there will be significant differences among those who self identify as
Republican/conservative vs. those individuals who self identify as Democratic/liberal. Global
warming- causes is an important dependent variable because those using rhetoric in support of
climate change need to be able to understand the views of their constituents prior to attempting to
persuade those constituents that humans are indeed accelerating climate change.
Trust in Science
Since the basis of both the pro climate change and anti climate change rhetoric is science,
it is important to gauge whether people trust the scientific information they are presented with
and if they trust the members of the scientific community who are delivering that information.
Marty notes the importance of this variable.
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“[Also of importance] are trust issues among and between those represented by the words
“science” and “religion” and these are transacted in public life....The decline in the power
of religious institutions and the measurements of positive religious interest have
drastically declined, in most of the world the old religions have revived and become
assertive. Often their rise has led many among them to challenge science and the
institutions devoted to it” (2010, 162-163).
Marty‟s statement intertwines the dependent variable of trust in science with one of the
independent variables, the importance of religious faith. Based on Marty‟s work, those who self
identify as believing in an increased level of the importance of their religion will show
significant increases in responses to variables that will question the science of climate change,
i.e. individuals who believe that their religion is important or very important will show increased
support when they are exposed to the politicization of climate change.
Even when religion is taken out of the equation, the scientific world can still suffer from
lost or misplaced trust from the public. Revolutionary results are published one month, and six
months later another revolutionary study is published that completely disproves the previous
revolutionary study. Also, scientists and their research are subject to public scrutiny just as
politicians are. The difference is that politicians are represented more frequently in the media via
sound bites and speeches, and the mass of scientific information being published can sometimes
keep a scientific scandal from being brought to the public‟s attention for some time. Nowotny
notes,
“Public controversies have, for a variety of reasons, lead to a pervasive sense of distrust
of the independence and impartiality of scientific expertise, side by side with the distrust
of political authorities and of industry. The credibility of scientists, even if the public
still judges it higher than that of politicians or other interest groups, is in decline. Science
is no longer seen as independent and standing above vested interests. In contrast to
science‟s public self-image as neutral, its image has become contaminated by what are
perceived as too close ties to state and industrial interests” (2005, 2).
Brooks adds to Nowotny‟s discussion by adding how funding sources also undermine
individual‟s trust in science. Brooks notes that
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“about 70 percent of all scientists and engineers work for private industry, many of them
under contract with the federal government. Not more than 12 percent work for
universities and independent nonprofit institutions, and even this segment has its research
predominantly funded by the federal government” (1980, 108).
This makes it almost impossible for scientists to conduct scientific research as they were trained
to in colleges in universities. Scientists often find themselves held hostage to the will and
agendas of those outside of the scientific world. Brooks also notes the level of distrust among
scientific institutions. “To a large extent, I think that the distrust of science that exists is not a
distrust of science itself, or of the scientific method of knowing reality, but a distrust of the
institutions which are the main employers of science and scientists” (Brooks 1980, 108). As
discussed in the political party/ideology section, the scientific world in the United States has
gained somewhat of a reputation in the last two decades. Both Bush administrations‟ overt
manipulation of scientific findings and testimonies have led to an increasing distrust around
overall science, particularly climate change science. Based on this information, it would be
expected that those who self identify as Republican/conservative may have an increased trust in
science, while those who self-identify as Democratic/liberal or Independent may have a
decreased trust in science. Individuals are considering the overall implications of the deception
that results when government gets too involved in the scientific world. Looking at the scientific
manipulation that has been uncovered, one wonders how much additional scientific information
has been manipulated by the government and has not been revealed?
Scientists would like to present their work as unbiased so that they have the public‟s trust.
Glotz discusses the responsibilities that scientists have to the public,
“Science can no longer deny that it has practical and political, as well as ethical,
consequences. The scientists, because of their technical knowledge, must be the first to
give warning, since they can anticipate the problems that result from a successful
application of their work” (1980, 11).
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Scientists also have a responsibility to be truthful with the public no matter the consequences the
government may threaten, because scientists deal with information that affects the very existence
of life and Earth‟s resources.
There is additional literature on climate change and trust/confidence in scientists.
Kellstedt‟s work looks at confidence in scientists as an independent variable, although it is
explored as a dependent variable for the purpose of this research. Previous studies found that
“confidence in scientists has unexpected effects: respondents with high confidence in scientists
feel less responsible for global warming, and also show less concern for global warming”
(Kellstedt et al 2008, 113). Kellstedt et al explain this surprising finding further,
“Respondents who showed a great deal of confidence that scientists understand global
warming and climate change showed significantly less concern for the risks of global
warming than did those who have lower trust in scientists. Though this effect differs
from our expectations, it is consistent with the notion that people trust that scientists will
be able, somehow, to devise technical solutions to any problems that arise because of
global warming and climate change” (2008, 121).
Brooks also notes this unexpected effect with regards to trust in science is also occurring
simultaneously in that,
“....there seems to also be an increasing belief that scientists can accomplish almost
anything if the public is willing to hold their feet to the fire....Thus the paradox is that
distrust of science and faith in science go hand in hand. The public feels it can stop
particular technologies because, somehow or other, the technical community can always
come up with alternatives, and technology can be channeled with money alone or with
sufficient political will. The other side of the coin is that the problems facing humanity
in the next fifty years appear irresolvable without a heavy input from science and
technology” (1980, 109-110).
So, in one scenario the public has become skeptical of scientists and their work. In another
scenario, individuals have this unfailing faith that scientists will deliver truthful information, as
long as those scientists are aware of the possibility of being called on the carpet. The question is:
how much of this scientific information is actually getting to the general public? Even if the
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public takes issue with scientific findings, what are the implications for scientists, especially if
the findings correspond with the wishes of those in government who are funding the research?
Brooks makes the important note that even when considering the attitudes and beliefs of
the public regarding this issue, the individuals who are considered to be members of the “public”
are extremely diverse, and their diversity could influence responses and opinions on climate
change.
“The evidence on public attitudes towards science and technology is very mixed.
Furthermore, one cannot talk about a single public; there are many different publics- the
“man in the street” with a low level of consciousness about science, the literary
intellectual of the mass media, the average educated man largely represented in
professional groups, the disadvantaged individual from a minority group, today‟s woman,
the young person. Each of these has distinctive attitudes” (Brooks 1980, 97).
Of the different “publics” that Brooks notes, this research utilizes a “public” comprised of
undergraduate students. It will be helpful in future research to duplicate this research with an
even more diverse group that reflects individuals at multiple education levels and multiple levels
of understanding regarding science, as Brooks mentions.
Scientific Information vs. Risks
Another way to gauge whether individuals have faith in the results of the scientific world
besides explicitly asking individuals about their level of trust in science is to ask them whether
they believe that the information science provides to the public is outweighed by any risks
involved in that research (or vice versa). With regards to trust and risks, Kellstedt et al found
that “trust has been shown to be an important correlate of interpretations of risk and resultant
support or opposition to policy choices in the face of risk” (Kellstedt et al 2008, 115).
Even though both trust in science and scientific information vs. risks are dependent
variables in this research, results similar to the trust in science variable are expected for the
scientific information vs. risks variable, with Republican/conservatives expected to show an
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increased support for the scientific information vs. risks variable, while Democrats/liberals and
Independents are expected to show decreased support for the scientific information vs. risks
variable. With regard to race and gender, “research consistently shows that women and racial
minorities are more fearful of the risks of climate change” (Bord et al and O‟Conner et al as
cited in Kellstedt et al 2008, 114). Based on this finding, it is expected that women and
minorities will show decreased support for the scientific information vs. risks variable when
compared to Caucasian males.
Hypotheses
Although I have noted expected interaction effects in the previous sections of this paper,
the main hypotheses are related to the three climate change frames: public health, morality, and
national security. Based on existing literature on climate change, politicization, framing,
attitudes and behavior, I propose four hypotheses. First, that exposure to rhetoric (via frames in
the form of the public health, morality and national security frames) will increase attitudinal
measures that denote support for future action on climate change. Second, I hypothesize that
once politicization that introduces skepticism regarding climate change is added individually to
each of the climate change frames, support will decrease in attitudinal measures for future action
on climate change. Third, with respect to the three frames I hypothesize that the morality frame
will create more of an increase in attitudinal measures that denote support for future action on
climate change than either the public health or national security frame. Fourth, I also
hypothesize that the public health frame will create more of an increase in attitudinal measures
that denote support for future action on climate change than the national security frame will, but
the public health frame will not create more of an increase in attitudinal measures that denote
support for future action on climate change than the morality frame will. To summarize the third
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and fourth hypotheses, frame strength from least to greatest will be: national security< public
health< morality.
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2.

EXPERIMENT

Research Methods/ Experimental Design
This study utilized the research method of descriptive surveys. Attitudes and behavior
were operationalized via a survey questionnaire. Rhetoric was operationalized by the use of
specific frames that support the existence of climate change and by the use of politicization that
does not support the existence of climate change. Since this research involved human subjects,
an application with Georgia State‟s Institutional Review Board (IRB) was submitted. The IRB
application was approved. Table 1 displays the verbiage utilized in the survey.
Table 1: Rhetoric to Measure Affects on Attitude and Behavior
Rhetoric
Public Health Frame

Verbiage
Climate change poses a danger to public health. It will lead to an
environment where deadly conditions such as cholera thrive.
Increased temperatures will damage plant life, which will in turn
reduce the amount of food available to the human population.

Morality Frame

Climate change is a moral dilemma and future generations will
suffer the most severe consequences. We don't inherit the earth
from our ancestors; we borrow it from our children. Caring about
our children and their progeny is part of what makes us human.

National Security
Frame

Climate change will pose profound strategic and security
challenges to the United States in coming decades, raising the
prospect of military intervention to deal with the effects of
violent storms, drought, mass migration and pandemics.

Politicization

Skeptics argue that the climate-change-models scientists use to
predict long-term weather patterns rely on a number of
questionable assumptions. Politicians often cite such arguments
in debates about whether climate change is really happening.
The mixed evidence suggests that this debate will continue
because the science appears to be unresolved.

Survey questions utilized randomized combinations of select parts of the verbiage in table 1, and
survey questions were modeled to represent each of 8 individual conditions:
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1. Control group (No frames and no politicization)
2. Public health frame + no politicization
3. Morality frame + no politicization
4. National security frame + no politicization
5. Politicization + no frame
6. Politicization + public health frame
7. Politicization + morality frame
8. Politicization + national security frame
Effect on attitudes was measured by asking specific questions after each treatment, and
effect on behavior was measured by that individual‟s survey response, which indicated that
individual‟s intention to perform that behavior. Therefore, the main independent variable was
politicization (which will deny the existence of climate change) and each of the three frames
(which all support the existence of climate change), while the dependent variables will be both
attitudes regarding climate change and behaviors regarding climate change measured based on
respondents‟ survey answers. Appendix A contains both the survey questions/statements and the
corresponding possible survey responses.
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3. RESULTS
Findings and Data Analysis
For this study, data was collected in the form of paper survey questionnaires distributed
to undergraduate students. An equal number of surveys in each of the 8 conditions were printed.
The number of the condition (1 through 8) was denoted in the lower right hand corner of the last
page of the survey so that respondents would not be distracted by the survey number. The
surveys were then manually placed in order from conditions 1 through 8, followed by another set
of conditions 1 through 8, etc. Table 2 notes the conditions and their corresponding number.
Table 2: Corresponding Variable Labels for Experimental Conditions
Variable
Control
Phealthonly
Moralonly
Nsecuronly
Policonly
Phealthpolic
Moralpolic
Nsecurpolic

Condition
Control (1)
Public Health Frame Only (2)
Morality Frame Only (3)
National Security Frame Only (4)
Politicization Only (5)
Public Health Frame + Politicization (6)
Morality Frame + Politicization (7)
National Security Frame + Politicization (8)

335 students completed the surveys, and the data was entered into a Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet. The data was then transferred directly into the STATA statistics program, in which
t-tests were run to make a pairwise correlation between each condition of the experiment in
comparison to the control group. The next step was determining what type of regression was
most appropriate to analyze the survey data. The proportional odds/parallel regression
assumption of ordinary least squares regression was violated by the fact that surveys have noninterval outcome [dependent] variables. Since OLS regression was ruled out, the pairwise
correlations discovered by the t-tests were further explored via ordered probit regression in
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STATA. Since the four hypotheses are directional, the results of one tailed t-tests were reported.

Results
There were a total of 15 dependent variables. Survey responses were collected on all of
the dependent variables reviewed in the theory portion of this research paper. While the results
of the variables were interesting, for the purpose of this research the focus was narrowed down to
the results of four variables: gwarmcause, trustscientists, threatindhealth, and threatsec.
Descriptive statistics listing the question or statement correlated with each variable are listed in
appendix C.
Frames
When revisiting the four hypotheses regarding the frames in conjunction with viewing the
results listed in the appendix B, interesting results emerge. Hypothesis one was that exposure to
rhetoric (via frames in the form of the public health, morality and national security frames) will
create an increase (positive coefficient) in attitudinal measures that denote support for future
action on climate change. Tables 10 and 11 show that hypothesis one was supported in that
exposure to the public health, morality frame, and national security frame (coefficients 0.41 &
0.41; 0.50 & 0.48; and 0.46 & 0.51 respectively) increased the belief in respondents that climate
change is an actual threat to national security. This result between the three frames and the
threatsec dependent variable is expected, especially with regards to the national security frame,
which includes rhetoric that speaks directly to climate change‟s possible threat to national
security. The other two frames use rhetoric that purports climate change as an issue of morality
or a threat to an individual‟s health, so both of those frames also should show positive
coefficients for the threatsec dependent variable.
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Hypothesis two was that once politicization that introduces skepticism regarding climate
change is added individually to each of the climate change frames, support would decrease for
attitudinal measures for future action on climate change. Tables 4 and 5 show that exposure to
the combination of the national security frame and politicization resulted in a significant,
negative coefficient (coefficients -0.37 and -0.38 respectively) for the variable gwarmcause,
meaning that those respondents were more likely to believe that global warming is caused by
human activity as opposed to natural causes. This result could be related more to the fact that the
respondent pool was heavily Liberal/Democratic.
With regard to hypothesis two, many interesting results also emerged. Tables 4 and 5
reflect that exposure to the morality frame for the variable gwarmcause (coefficients -0.34 and 0.32 respectively) resulted in respondents being more likely to believe that global warming is
caused by human activity as opposed to natural causes. Unexpectedly, tables 6 and 7 show that
politicization, the combination of the public health frame and politicization, and the combination
of the morality frame and politicization (coefficients 0.36 & 0.39; 0.42 & 0.43; and 0.41 & 0.41
respectively) increased agreement with the statement, “Scientists can be trusted to deliver correct
and accurate information to citizens about global warming”. Tables 8 and 9 reflect that exposure
to politicization, the combination of the public health frame and politicization, the combination
of the morality frame and politicization, and the combination of the national security frame and
politicization (coefficients 0.56 & 0.57; 0.38 & 0.38; 0.38 & 0.40; and 0.44 & 0.50 respectively)
actually made respondents more likely to believe that climate change is a threat to their
individual health. This result was anticipated with the frames were present without
politicization, but the result also occurred once politicization was introduced into the survey.
Tables 10 and 11 show that exposure to politicization, the combination of the public health frame
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and politicization, the combination of the morality frame and politicization, and the combination
of the national security frame and politicization (coefficients 0.54 & 0.52; 0.63 & 0.61; 0.40 &
0.46; and 0.61 & 0.66 respectively) caused respondents to report an increased belief in the
perception of climate change as an actual threat to national security
Hypothesis three was that with respect to the three frames the morality frame will create
more of an increase in attitudinal measures that denote support for future action on climate
change than either the public health or national security frame. Hypothesis three is supported by
the fact that morality was the only frame of the three frames in tables 6 and 7 that had a
significant coefficient for the variable trustscientists, with the morality frame also standing as the
only frame to result in a significant, positive coefficient. Table 10 also supports hypothesis
three, in that the positive coefficient for the morality frame (0.50) is higher than the coefficients
for the public health (0.41) and national security (0.46) frames. The higher coefficient denotes
increased belief in the perception of climate change as an actual threat to national security.
Table 11 shows slightly different results, as the coefficient for the morality frame (0.48) is higher
than the coefficient for the public health frame (0.41), but is lower than the coefficient for the
national security frame (0.51). This was expected in that the morality frame is rooted in the
belief that individual actions do have an effect on the climate and the belief that current
generations must be good stewards over the environment so that the environment will be in
sufficient condition for future generations. The morality frame may have had a larger effect on
the dependent variable trustscientists than the other two frames did because those exposed to the
morality frame may feel the need to trust the science that is being presented to them so that they
will know how to properly maintain the Earth for future generations.
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Hypothesis four was that the public health frame will create more of an increase in
attitudinal measures that denote support for future action on climate change than the national
security frame will, but the public health frame will not create more of an increase in attitudinal
measures that denote support for future action on climate change than the morality frame will.
To summarize the third and fourth hypotheses, frame strength from least to greatest was
expected to be: national security< public health< morality. There were not significant results for
all three frames for most variables so comparison of the three variables with respect to
hypothesis four is limited. In scenarios where all three frames were significant, tables 10 and 11
reflect that the coefficient for the public health frame was actually lower than the coefficient for
the national security frame (0.41 vs. 0.46 and 0.41 vs. 0.51 respectively) for both models with
regard to the dependent variable threatsec. While this finding does not align with hypothesis
four, this finding does align with the fact that the national security frame would be expected to
reflect a large positive coefficient for the dependent variable that it is directly related to,
threatsec.
Covariates
Descriptive statistics providing additional information on each covariate are listed in
appendix C. Table 4 shows that for the variable gwarmcause, those respondents who self
identified as conservative and Republican resulted in a positive coefficient (0.26 and 0.25
respectively), which meant that those respondents are more likely to believe that global warming
is due to natural causes as opposed to being due to human activities. This aligns with existing
literature. The negative coefficient (-0.48) in table 5 for those who self identified as liberal
supports existing literature in that a negative coefficient for the variable gwarmcause means that
those respondents were more likely to believe that climate change is due to human activities.
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Table 8 reflects that respondents who self identified as liberal (coefficient 0.41) were more likely
to believe that climate change is a threat to their individual health, and table 9 reflects that
respondents who self identified as conservative (coefficient -0.66) were less likely to believe that
climate change is a threat to their individual health. Table 10 shows that respondents who self
identified as Democrat (coefficient 0.38) show increased belief in the perception of climate
change as an actual threat to national security. When looking at ideology, table 11 shows that
respondents who self identified as conservative (-0.28 coefficient) showed a decreased belief in
the perception of climate change as an actual threat to national security. Table 7 reflects that
respondents who self identified as Republican showed decreased belief that “scientists can be
trusted to deliver correct and accurate information to citizens about global warming”. This may
stem from the fact that much of scientific research has shown an accelerated level of climate
change, while Republicans often believe that climate change is progressing at a standard, natural
rate. Republicans are reluctant to trust scientists who deliver results that do not align with their
own beliefs. Nowotny‟s previous literature on the topic of trust in science may be coming into
play here.
Other interesting results emerged from this study. Table 8 shows that those who self
identified as Caucasian showed a decreased belief (coefficient -0.47) that climate change is a
threat to their individual health. Table 11 shows that those who self identified as Caucasian also
showed a decreased belief (coefficient -0.44) in the perception of climate change as an actual
threat to national security. Both results regarding those who self identified as Caucasian align
with the research of Brody et al. A surprising result is the negative coefficient displayed in table
6 (-0.21) among respondents who self identified as female with regard to the variable
trustscientists. This denotes that women were less likely to believe that “scientists can be trusted
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to deliver correct and accurate information to citizens about global warming”. This is somewhat
of a divergence from Borick and Rabe‟s research on gender. Table 7 also reflects that African
Americans are less likely to believe that “scientists can be trusted to deliver correct and accurate
information to citizens about global warming”. Table 6 also shows that respondents who self
identified as liberal (coefficient 0.43) showed increased belief that “scientists can be trusted to
deliver correct and accurate information to citizens about global warming”. This result was
unexpected considering the existing literature on the politicization and manipulation of science
amongst Republican administrations.
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4. CONCLUSIONS

Discussion
The most surprising finding from this study is that while framing rhetoric was
occasionally found to significantly increase attitudinal measures that denote support for future
action on climate change, politicization was found to be influential in its own right.
Politicization that questioned the science of climate change has the power to both increase and
decrease support for attitudinal measures with regard to climate change. In this research,
politicization often amplified support for attitudinal measures that denote support for future
action on climate change. One reason for this could be the exclusion of source information. The
politicization that questioned the science of climate change was not accompanied by a speaker‟s
name, and the speaker‟s political party and political ideology were not attached to the
politicization. Often the source of information can have an additional effect on public opinion,
i.e. if the politicization questioning the science of climate change comes from former President
George W. Bush, then his constituents in the Republican party would be expected to be more
receptive to the information as opposed to if the information came from a rare Democratic
politician who would question the science surrounding climate change. This source information
effect would also be expected from Democrats receiving rhetoric from elected officials within
their party vs. the same rhetoric from elected officials from the opposing party.
The results regarding framing and politicization when combined could be due to several
factors. The first factor is that the frames are more influential on attitudes and behavioral
intention than politicization is. Another factor for this unexpected finding could be that
respondents were already so firmly grounded in their attitudes toward climate change that even
the addition of politicization could do little to nothing to changing their attitudes. Ultimately, the
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models show that while politicization was hypothesized to have an expected counter effect on the
power of frames, framing rhetoric ultimately was more influential in changing attitudes and
behavioral intentions when framing and politicization were both presented simultaneously to
survey respondents.
It is also important to note that the descriptive statistics table in appendix C shows that
almost 44% of the survey respondents self identified as Democrat while less than 17% of the
survey respondents self identified as Republican. Existing literature points to several expected
outcomes based on partisanship. The majority of the results here align with that existing
literature regarding partisanship, with conservatives/Republicans showing a belief that climate
change is due more to natural causes, and liberals/Democrats are reporting a belief that climate
change is due more to human activities.
Azjen and Cote‟s research provide insight on why many of the results returned either null
or as the opposite of the intended result via Azjen‟s theory of planned behavior.
“Briefly, according to the theory of planned behavior [TPB], human action is influenced
by three major factors: a favorable or unfavorable evaluation of the behavior (attitude
toward behavior), perceived social pressure to perform or not perform the behavior
(subjective norm), and perceived capability to perform the behavior (self-efficacy;
Bandura 1997, or perceived behavioral control). In combination, attitude toward
behavior, subjective norm, and perception of behavioral control lead to the formation of a
behavioral intention” (2008, 301).
This explanation, especially the portion regarding subjective norms, can be utilized to explain the
research findings here. Students were the respondents in this study, and designated times to take
the surveys were confirmed with instructors prior to administering the survey. Students could
have possibly viewed the survey as “something extra” to do, especially because the students
were not promised the incentives that they may be familiar with when completing surveys,
namely extra course credit. In having knowledge of the survey ahead of time, students may have
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decided not to answer questions seriously or may have decided to not respond as they normally
would if there had been some type of reward attached. The opinions of fellow students may have
been influential before the students even took the survey.
Conclusion
This study has contributed to existing research on framing and politicization rhetoric,
specifically with regard to climate change. Previous research looked at the effect of either
frames or politicization on respondent‟s opinions regarding climate change. This research
contributes to that body of research by simultaneously looking at both frames and politicization
to test the influential power of both forms of rhetoric. The findings of this study show that
frames are able to change attitudes and behavior in select cases. The results reported here also
contribute to the small body of research that has discussed the impact of politicization of science
on political behavior. While this research found that politicization is not as influential in
changing attitudes and behavioral intentions when politicization is combined with framing
rhetoric, and politicization may possibly even have the opposite expected effect in changing
attitudes and behavior, this finding is still valuable in that it adds to the guidelines that scientists
and politicians can utilize when forming discourse around climate change.
Future research could take several different paths: the use of different frames, a
politicization statement that is worded differently, and the survey of respondents who are older
(to check for an effect of age on the morality frame results). Future research could also include a
larger sample size in order to capture a more balanced political party/political ideology
representation that would reflect an increased Republican party presence. Different dependent
variables that measure different attitudes and behavioral intentions toward climate change action
could also be explored. It would also be interesting to add the name and political affiliation of

46
the speaker with which the frame and politicization originated to see the effect that the origin of
the rhetoric has on the results. An even more interesting experiment would be to transpose the
originators of the statements to see if respondents within the same political party would react
differently to the same exact statement coming from a person with different political ideologies
from their own political ideologies.
Climate change continues to be such a controversial issue that one wonders whether those
in government will ever arrive at enough of a consensus to take any action that will truly mitigate
the issue. So far, much of the time has been spent arguing over the existence of or causes of
climate change. All the while increasingly erratic weather patterns and the spike in the number
of natural disasters seem to clearly support one side of the climate change debate. The bottom
line is that it is becoming increasingly difficult for even the biggest climate change skeptics to
deny what is happening to our world.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
(Condition 1: Control)

Survey Questions
Part 1. For each question or statement please indicate your choice below by placing an “x”
above your response (unless instructed otherwise).
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
Independent, or something else?

Democratic

Republican

Independent

Something Else

Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?

Closer to the
Republicans

Closer to the
Democrats

Neither

How important is your political party to you personally?
Extremely
Unimportant

Very
Unimportant

Somewhat
Unimportant

Neither Important Somewhat
Nor Unimportant Important

Very
Important

Extremely
Important

Yes, Cuban

Yes, South
American

Yes, Other

Are you male or female?

Male

Female

Are you of Hispanic or Latino descent?
No, I’m Not

Yes, Mexican

Yes, Puerto
Rican

Yes, Central
American

Please place an “x” next to one or more categories below to indicate your race and ethnicity.
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Multi-Racial
Asian/Pacific Islander
African American
Caucasian American
Native American or Alaska Native
Other Ethnicity

Please write in your response. What year were you born?
______________

Are you currently married, widowed, divorced, separated or never married?

Married

Widowed

Divorced

Separated

Never
Married

When it comes to politics, would you describe yourself as liberal, conservative, or neither liberal
nor conservative?

Very
Conservative

Somewhat
Conservative

Slightly
Conservative

Moderate

Slightly
Liberal

Somewhat
Liberal

Very
Liberal

Often things come up and people are not able to register to vote. Would records from any state
show that you are currently registered to vote, or like many others are you not registered at this
time?

Yes, I am a registered voter

No, I am not a registered voter.

Not Sure

Now using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at all important and ten means
extremely important, how important is religious faith in your life? Please place an “x” inside the
circle next to your choice.


0 - Not at all important



1



2



3



4
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5



6



7



8



9



10 - Extremely important

Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? More than once
a week, once a week, one or twice a month, a few times a year, seldom or never?

More Than
Once a Week

Once a Week

Once or Twice
A Month

A Few Times
A Year

Seldom

Never

Would you describe yourself as either a “born-again” or evangelical Christian?

No

Yes

Generally speaking, how often do you feel that you can trust other people?

Always

Most of
the time

About half
the time

Once in a
while

Never

Would you say that the government is pretty much RUN BY A FEW BIG INTERESTS looking
out for themselves or that the government is run for the BENEFIT OF ALL THE PEOPLE?

Government run by a few big interests

Government for the benefit of all

How much of the time do you think that you can trust the federal government in Washington to
make decisions in a fair way?

Never

Rarely

Sometimes

Quite Often

Very Often

Part 2. For each question or statement please indicate your choice below by placing an “x”
above your response (unless instructed otherwise).
We will next ask you some questions related to your opinions about climate change.
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Global warming refers to the idea that the world‟s average temperature has been increasing over
the past 150 years and may be increasing more in the future. What do you think? Do you think
that global warming is happening?

Definitely is
NOT

Very Likely
NOT

Probably is
NOT

Not Sure

Probably is

Very Likely
is

Definitely is

If global warming is happening, to what extent do you think it is caused by human activities, as
opposed to natural changes in the environment?

Definitely
Human

Very Likely
Human

Probably
Human

Not Sure

Probably
Natural

Very Likely
Natural

Definitely
Natural

Indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Scientists can
be trusted to deliver correct and accurate information to citizens about global warming.”

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neither Agree
Nor Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement: “If everyone
does his or her part and works together, we can reverse the adverse effects of global warming.”

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neither Agree
Nor Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

How willing would you be to purchase an energy efficient vehicle, even if it costs significantly
more money to purchase?

Extremely
Unwilling

Moderately
Unwilling

Somewhat
Unwilling

Neither Willing
Nor Unwilling

Somewhat
Willing

Moderately
Willing

Extremely
Willing

To what extent do you oppose or support laws and regulations that would limit the nation‟s
green-house gas emission, even if these laws were costly to consumers and businesses?

Strongly
Oppose

Moderately
Oppose

Slightly
Oppose

Neither Oppose
Nor Support

Slightly
Support

Moderately
Support

Strongly
Support

Would you be interested in receiving more information (in the form of one email message) about
steps you can take to reduce your carbon output?

Yes

No
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Opinions are often mixed on the advantages of science when compared to the risks involved. To
what extent do you believe that any risks in science are outweighed by the information gained
from scientific research?

not at all

to a small
extent

to a moderate
extent

to a great
extent

to a very
great extent

To what extent do you feel that the information gained from scientific research is outweighed by
the risks?

not at all

to a small
extent

to a moderate
extent

to a great
extent

to a very
great extent

How much faith do you have in the ability of science to solve society‟s problems?

1
Little Faith

2

3

4
Not Sure

5

6

7
Great Faith

To what extent do you perceive climate change to be an actual threat to Earth and Earth‟s natural
resources?

not at all

to a small
extent

to a moderate
extent

to a great
extent

to a very
great extent

To what extent do you perceive climate change to be an actual threat to your individual health?

not at all

to a small
extent

to a moderate
extent

to a great
extent

to a very
great extent

To what extent do you perceive climate change to be an actual threat to the health of other people
on the planet?

not at all

to a small
extent

to a moderate
extent

to a great
extent

to a very
great extent

To what extent do you perceive climate change to be an actual threat to national security?

not at all

to a small
extent

to a moderate
extent

to a great
extent

to a very
great extent
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To what extent do you believe it is your responsibility to maintain and/or improve upon the Earth
and its natural resources for future generations?

not at all

to a small
extent

to a moderate
extent

to a great
extent

to a very
great extent

The seven remaining conditions contained the same information plus the addition of a statement
in the form of a frame, politicization or the combination of both in bold font directly underneath
the “We will next ask you some questions related to your opinions about climate change”
statement in part 2 of the survey.
(Condition 2: Public Health Frame Only)
Climate change poses a danger to public health. It will lead to an environment where deadly
conditions such as cholera thrive. Increased temperatures will damage plant life, which will in
turn reduce the amount of food available to the human population.
(Condition 3: Morality Frame Only)
Climate change is a moral dilemma and future generations will suffer the most severe
consequences. We don't inherit the earth from our ancestors; we borrow it from our children.
Caring about our children and their progeny is part of what makes us human.
(Condition 4: National Security Frame Only)
Climate change will pose profound strategic and security challenges to the United States in
coming decades, raising the prospect of military intervention to deal with the effects of violent
storms, drought, mass migration and pandemics.
(Condition 5: Politicization Only)
Skeptics argue that the climate-change-models scientists use to predict long-term weather
patterns rely on a number of questionable assumptions. Politicians often cite such arguments in
debates about whether climate change is really happening. The mixed evidence suggests that
this debate will continue because the science appears to be unresolved.
(Condition 6: Public Health Frame and Politicization)
Climate change poses a danger to public health. It will lead to an environment where deadly
conditions such as cholera thrive. Increased temperatures will damage plant life, which will in
turn reduce the amount of food available to the human population.
On the other hand, skeptics argue that the climate-change-models scientists use to predict longterm weather patterns rely on a number of questionable assumptions. Politicians often cite such
arguments in debates about whether climate change is really happening. The mixed evidence
suggests that this debate will continue because the science appears to be unresolved.
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(Condition 7: Morality and Politicization)
Climate change is a moral dilemma and future generations will suffer the most severe
consequences. We don't inherit the earth from our ancestors; we borrow it from our children.
Caring about our children and their progeny is part of what makes us human.
On the other hand, skeptics argue that the climate-change-models scientists use to predict longterm weather patterns rely on a number of questionable assumptions. Politicians often cite such
arguments in debates about whether climate change is really happening. The mixed evidence
suggests that this debate will continue because the science appears to be unresolved.
(Condition 8: National Security and Politicization)
Climate change will pose profound strategic and security challenges to the United States in
coming decades, raising the prospect of military intervention to deal with the effects of violent
storms, drought, mass migration and pandemics.
On the other hand, skeptics argue that the climate-change-models scientists use to predict longterm weather patterns rely on a number of questionable assumptions. Politicians often cite such
arguments in debates about whether climate change is really happening. The mixed evidence
suggests that this debate will continue because the science appears to be unresolved.
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Appendix B
Table 3: T-Tests: Conditions Relative to Control
***=P<0.01; **=P < 0.05; * P= < 0.10 Based on one tailed t-tests
Dependent Variable
Gwarmhap
Gwarmcause

Trustscientists

Revwarming

Effvehicles
Emissionlaws
Moreinfo
Scirisksinfo

Sciinforisks
Faithscience

Threatearth

Threatindhealth

Condition/Condition #
National Security Frame and Politicization (8)
Morality Frame (3)
Politicization (5)
National Security Frame and Politicization (8)
Morality Frame (3)
Politicization (5)
Public Health Frame and Politicization (6)
Morality Frame and Politicization (7)
Morality Frame (3)
Politicization (5)
Public Health Frame and Politicization (6)
Morality Frame and Politicization (7)
No significant conditions
National Security Frame (4)
Public Health Frame and Politicization (6)
Morality Frame (3)
Public Health Frame (2)
Politicization (5)
Public Health Frame and Politicization (6)
National Security Frame and Politicization (8)
No significant conditions
Public Health Frame (2)
Morality Frame (3)
National Security Frame (4)
Public Health Frame and Politicization (6)
Morality Frame and Politicization (7)
National Security Frame and Politicization (8)
Politicization (5)
Morality Frame and Politicization (7)
National Security Frame and Politicization (8)
Public Health Frame (2)
Politicization (5)
Public Health Frame and Politicization (6)
National Security Frame and Politicization (8)

Mean/Standard Deviation
6 (0.98)***
2.67 (1.51)**
2.66 (1.33)**
2.59 (1.18)***
3.56 (1.03)**
3.59 (0.11)***
3.54 (0.92)**
3.5 (0.86)**
3.63 (1.09)***
3.73 (0.95)***
3.46 (1.10)**
3.43 (0.80)**
N/A (N/A)
4.33 (1.52)*
5.02 (1.62)*
1.81 (0.39)***
3.12 (0.75)***
3.17 (0.86)***
3.19 (0.75)***
3.19 (0.87)***
N/A (N/A)
4.44 (1.67)*
4.44 (1.62)**
4.70 (1.54)***
4.90 (1.45)***
4.5 (1.38)**
4.37 (1.44)*
3.95 (0.92)***
3.74 (1.11)*
3.68 (0.88)*
3.37 (1.02)**
3.66 (1.09)***
3.4 (1.03)**
3.43 (0.84)***
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Table 3. Continued T-Tests: Conditions Relative to Control
***=P<0.01; **=P < 0.05; * P= < 0.10 Based on one tailed t-tests

Dependent
Variable
Threathlthothers

Threatsec

Responearth

Condition/Condition #

Mean/Standard Deviation

Public Health Frame (2)
Morality Frame (3)
Politicization (5)
Public Health Frame and Politicization (6)
Morality Frame and Politicization (7)
National Security Frame and Politicization
(8)
Public Health Frame (2)
Morality Frame (3)
National Security Frame (4)
Politicization (5)
Public Health Frame and Politicization (6)
Morality Frame and Politicization (7)
National Security Frame and Politicization
(8)
Public Health Frame (2)
National Security Frame (4)
Politicization (5)
Public Health Frame and Politicization (6)
Morality Frame and Politicization (7)

3.59 (1.05)***
3.44 (0.18)**
3.73 (1.00)***
3.71 (0.87)***
3.40 (1.15)*
3.61 (0.83)***
2.73 (1.07)***
2.79 (1.30)***
2.70 (1.06)***
2.85 (1.06)***
2.85 (1.01)***
2.60 (1.04)***
2.85 (1.04)***
3.81 (0.93)**
3.72 (1.00)***
3.88 (0.90)*
3.80 (0.93)**
3.74 (0.99)**
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Table 4: Determinants of Support for the Causes of Global Warming, Model 1
***=P<0.01; **=P < 0.05; * P= < 0.10 Based on one tailed t-tests
Variable (Condition #)
Phealthonly (2)
Moralonly (3)
Nsecuronly (4)
Policonly (5)
Phealthpolic (6)
Moralpolic (7)
Nsecurpolic (8)
Yeschristian
Conservative
Male
Republican
Caucasian
Log-Likelihood/N

Coefficient (Standard Error)
-0.09 (0.24)
-0.34 (0.23)*
0.05 (0.23)
-0.24 (0.23)
-0.01 (0.23)
-0.04 (0.22)
-0.37 (0.23)*
0.02 (0.13)
0.26 (0.17)*
0.12 (0.12)
0.25 (0.19)*
0.02 (0.14)
-561.79 / 334

Table 5: Determinants of Support for the Causes of Global Warming, Model 2
***=P<0.01; **=P < 0.05; * P= < 0.10 Based on one tailed t-tests
Variable (Condition #)
Phealthonly (2)
Moralonly (3)
Nsecuronly (4)
Policonly (5)
Phealthpolic (6)
Moralpolic (7)
Nsecurpolic (8)
Female
Not Christian
African American
Democratic
Liberal
Log-Likelihood/N

Coefficient (Standard Error)
-0.09 (0.24)
-0.32 (0.23)*
0.02 (0.23)
-0.26 (0.24)
-0.04 (0.23)
-0.06 (0.23)
-0.38 (0.24)*
-0.08 (0.12)
-0.04 (0.13)
0.06 (0.13)
0.02 (0.13)
-0.48 (0.13)***
-532.22 / 321
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Table 6: Determinants of Trust in Scientists, Ordered Probit Model 1
***=P<0.01; **=P < 0.05; * P= < 0.10 Based on one tailed t-tests

Variable (Condition #)
Phealthonly (2)
Moralonly (3)
Nsecuronly (4)
Policonly (5)
Phealthpolic (6)
Moralpolic (7)
Nsecurpolic (8)
Notchristian
Female
Asian
Democratic
Liberal
Log-Likelihood/N

Coefficient (Standard Error)
0.20 (0.24)
0.32 (0.24)*
0.11 (0.24)
0.36 (0.24)*
0.42 (0.23)**
0.41 (0.23)**
0.07 (0.24)
0.15 (0.13)
-0.21 (0.12)**
0.10 (0.18)
-0.03 (0.13)
0.43 (0.13)***
-415.40 / 322

Table 7: Determinants of Trust in Scientists, Ordered Probit Model 2
***=P<0.01; **=P < 0.05; * P= < 0.10 Based on one tailed t-tests

Variable (Condition #)
Phealthonly (2)
Moralonly (3)
Nsecuronly (4)
Policonly (5)
Phealthpolic (6)
Moralpolic (7)
Nsecurpolic (8)
Yeschristian
Africanamerican
Conservative
Republican
Log-Likelihood/N

Coefficient (Standard Error)
0.22 (0.24)
0.41 (0.24)**
0.11 (0.23)
0.39 (0.24)**
0.43 (0.24)**
0.41 (0.24)**
0.08 (0.24)
-0.08 (0.13)
-0.20 (0.13)*
-0.21 (0.17)
-0.24 (0.19)*
-419.33 / 322
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Table 8: Determinants of Threats to Individual Health, Ordered Probit Model 1
***=P<0.01; **=P < 0.05; * P= < 0.10 Based on one tailed t-tests

Variable (Condition #)
Phealthonly (2)
Moralonly (3)
Nsecuronly (4)
Policonly (5)
Phealthpolic (6)
Moralpolic (7)
Nsecurpolic (8)
Yeschristian
Female
Liberal
Caucasian
Log-Likelihood/N

Coefficient (Standard Error)
0.28 (0.24)
0.08 (0.24)
0.11 (0.24)
0.56 (0.23)***
0.38 (0.23)*
0.38 (0.24)*
0.44 (0.23)**
-0.06 (0.13)
-0.01 (0.12)
0.41 (0.12)***
-0.47 (0.13)***
-446.11 / 319

Table 9: Determinants of Threats to Individual Health, Ordered Probit Model 2
***=P<0.01; **=P < 0.05; * P= < 0.10 Based on one tailed t-tests

Variable (Condition #)
Phealthonly (2)
Moralonly (3)
Nsecuronly (4)
Policonly (5)
Phealthpolic (6)
Moralpolic (7)
Nsecurpolic (8)
Conservative
Notchristian
Multiracial
Male
Log-Likelihood/N

Coefficient (Standard Error)
0.28 (0.24)
0.10 (0.24)
0.07 (0.24)
0.57 (0.24)***
0.38 (0.24)**
0.40 (0.24)**
0.50 (0.24)**
-0.66 (0.15)***
-0.07 (0.13)
0.10 (0.14)
-0.03 (0.12)
-448.50 / 319
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Table 10: Determinants of Threats to Security, Ordered Probit Model 1
***=P<0.01; **=P < 0.05; * P= < 0.10 Based on one tailed t-tests

Variable (Condition #)
Phealthonly (2)
Moralonly (3)
Nsecuronly (4)
Policonly (5)
Phealthpolic (6)
Moralpolic (7)
Nsecurpolic (8)
Notchristian
Moderate
Multiracial
Democratic
Male
Log-Likelihood/N

Coefficient (Standard Error)
0.41 (0.24)**
0.50 (0.24)**
0.46 (0.24)**
0.54 (0.24)***
0.63 (0.24)***
0.40 (0.24)**
0.61 (0.24)**
0.02 (0.13)
0.07 (0.12)
0.13 (0.14)
0.38 (0.12)***
0.10 (0.12)
-459.29 / 321

Table 11: Determinants of Threats to Security, Ordered Probit Model 2
***=P<0.01; **=P < 0.05; * P= < 0.10 Based on one tailed t-tests

Variable (Condition #)
Phealthonly (2)
Moralonly (3)
Nsecuronly (4)
Policonly (5)
Phealthpolic (6)
Moralpolic (7)
Nsecurpolic (8)
Female
Yeschristian
Independent
Conservative
Caucasian
Log-Likelihood/N

Coefficient (Standard Error)
0.41 (0.24)**
0.48 (0.24)**
0.51 (0.24)**
0.52 (0.24)**
0.61 (0.24)***
0.46 (0.24)**
0.66 (0.24)***
-0.10 (0.12)
-0.03 (0.13)
-0.07 (0.14)
-0.28 (0.15)**
-0.44 (0.13)***
-455.91 / 321
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Appendix C
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables, Independent Variables and Dependent Variables
Variable
PartyId

Question/Distribution
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a
Democrat, an Independent, or something else? (1= Democratic (43.7%); 2=
Republican (16.5%); 3= Independent (25.2%); 4= Other = (14.7%)

Mean/Standard Deviation
N/A

AlgmtParty

Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic
Party? (1= Closer to Republicans (25.1%); 2= Closer to Democrats (58.2%); 3=
Neither (16.7%)

1.92 (0.64)

ImpParty

How important is your political party to you personally? (1= Extremely
Unimportant (6.6%); 2= Very Unimportant (9.3%); 3= Somewhat Unimportant
(17.4%); 4= Neither Important or Unimportant (9.5%); 5= Somewhat Important
(29.6%), 6= Very Important (13.2%); 7= Extremely Important (4.5%)

N/A

Gender

Are you male or female? (Male = 39.4%, Female = 60.6%)

N/A

Hispanic

Are you of Hispanic or Latino descent? (No= 89.3%, Yes = 10.8%)

N/A

Race

Please place an “x” next to one or more categories below to indicate your race
and ethnicity. (Multi-Racial or Other Ethnicity = 23%, Asian/Pacific Islander =
12.7%, African American = 34.4%, Caucasian American = 29.9%)

N/A

Birth Year

Please write in your response. What year were you born?

1987 (8.09)

Marital Status

Are you currently married? (Married = 11.4%, Unmarried = 88.6%)

N/A

PolIdeo

When it comes to politics, would you describe yourself as liberal, conservative,
or neither liberal nor conservative? (Conservative = 22.5%, Moderate = 35.1%,
Liberal = 42.3%)

N/A
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VoteRegister

Often things come up and people are not able to register to vote. Would
records from any state show that you are currently registered to vote or like
many others are you not registered at this time? (Yes = 70.8%, No = 29.3%)

N/A

ImpReligion

Now using a scale from zero to then, where zero means not at all important and
ten means extremely important, how important is religious faith in your life?
Please place an “x” inside the circle next to your choice. (Not at all (0) = 9.6%,
(1) = 3.6%, (2) = 5.1%, (3) = 5.1%, (4) = 2.7%, Moderately important (5) =
8.4%, (6) = 4.8%, (7) = 8.7%, (8) = 9.3%, (9) = 9.6%, Extremely important
(10) = 33.4%)

6.65 (3.47)

RelAttend

Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?
More than once a week, once a week, one or twice a month, a few times a year,
seldom or never? (Once a week or more = 29.4%, Once or twice a month =
17.4%, A few times a year = 44.1%, Never = 9%)

N/A

Christian

Would you describe yourself as either a “born-again” or evangelical Christian? N/A
(No = 69.2%, Yes = 30.8%)
Generally speaking, how often do you feel that you can trust other people?
N/A
(Always or most of the time = 29.3%, About half of the time = 37.3%, Rarely =
27.2%, Never = 6.3%)
Would you say that the government is pretty much RUN BY A FEW BIG
N/A
INTERESTS looking out for themselves or that the government is run for the
BENEFIT OF ALL THE PEOPLE? (Few big interests = 79.4%, Benefit of all =
20.6%)

TrustPeople

GovtBenefit

TrustGovt

How much of the time do you think that you can trust the federal government in N/A
Washington to make decisions in a fair way? (Rarely or never = 32.2%,
Sometimes = 56.3%, Often = 11.5%)

GWarmHap

“Do you think that global warming is happening?” (1= Definitely is not
(1.2%); 2= Very likely not (2.7%); 3= Probably is not (3.3%); 4= Not Sure

5.65 (1.39)
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GWarmCause

TrustScientists

RevWarming

EffVehicles

(12.2%); 5= Probably is (18.8%); 6= Very likely is (27.2%); 7= Definitely is
(34.6%)
“If global warming is happening, to what extent do you think it is caused by
human activities, as opposed to natural changes in the environment?”
(1= Definitely human (15.6%); 2= Very likely human (31.4%); 3= Probably
human (22.8%); 4= Not Sure (16.5%); 5= Probably natural (6.3%); 6= Very
likely natural= (6%); 7= Definitely natural (1.5%)
Agreement with “Scientists can be trusted to deliver correct and accurate
information to citizens about global warming.” (1= Strongly disagree (2.7%);
2= Disagree (11.9%); 3= Neither agree nor disagree (36.7%); 4= Agree
(37.3%); 5= Strongly agree (11.3%)

2.90 (1.46)

3.43 (0.94)

Agreement with “If everyone does his or her part and works together, we can
3.39 (1.00)
reverse the adverse effects of global warming.” (1= Strongly disagree (2.7%);
2=Disagree (17.6%); 3= Neither agree nor disagree (29.9%); 4= Agree (37.3%);
5= Strongly agree (12.5%)
“How willing would you be to purchase an energy efficient vehicle, even if it
4.46 (1.60)
costs significantly more money to purchase?” (1= Extremely unwilling (5.1%);
2= Moderately unwilling (8.7%); 3= Somewhat unwilling (15.5%); 4= Neither
Willing nor unwilling (11.9%); 5=Somewhat willing (32.2%); 6= Moderately
willing (17.9%); 7= Extremely willing (8.7%)

EmissionLaws

“To what extent do you oppose or support laws and regulations that would limit
the nation‟s green-house gas emission, even if these laws were costly to
consumers and businesses?” (1= Strongly oppose (3.3%); 2= Moderately
oppose (6.6%); 3= Slightly oppose ;(9.9%) 4= Neither oppose nor support
(22.4%); 5= Slightly support (23.9%); 6= Moderately support (21.5%); 7=
Strongly support (12.5%)

4.72 (1.54)

MoreInfo

“Would you be interested in receiving more information (in the form of one
email message) about steps you can take to reduce your carbon output?” (1=
Yes (34.6%); 2= No (65.4%)

1.65 (0.48)
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SciRisksInfo

“To what extent do you believe that any risks in science are outweighed by the
information gained from scientific research?” (1= Not at all (4.2%); 2= To a
small extent (17.4%); 3= To a moderate extent (55.1%); 4= To a great extent
(17.1%); 5= To a very great extent (6.3%)

SciInfoRisks

“To what extent do you feel that the information gained from scientific research 2.93 (0.90)
is outweighed by the risks?” (1= Not at all (7.3%); 2= To a small extent
(18.7%); 3= To a moderate extent (51.1%); 4= To a great extent (19.3%); 5= To
a very great extent (3.6%)

FaithScience

“How much faith do you have in the ability of science to solve society‟s
problems?” (1= Little faith (5.4%); 2= (7.5%); 3= (9.9%); 4= Not sure (23%);
5= (29.9%); 6= (17.3%); 7= Great faith (7.2%)

ThreatEarth

“To what extent do you perceive climate change to be an actual threat to Earth
3.61 (1.03)
and Earth‟s natural resources?” (1= Not at all (3%); 2= To a small extent
(10.5%); 3= To a moderate extent (30.5%); 4= To a great extent (34.1%); 5= To
a very great extent (21.9%)

ThreatIndHlth

“To what extent do you perceive climate change to be an actual threat to your
individual health?” (1= Not at all (5.1%); 2= To a small extent (16.3%); 3= To
a moderate extent (37.4%); 4= To a great extent (25.9%); 5= To a very great
extent (15.4%)

ThreatHlthOthers

“To what extent do you perceive climate change to be an actual threat to the
3.47 (1.02)
health of other people on the planet?” (1= Not at all (3%); 2= To a small extent
(13.8%); 3= To a moderate extent (33.5%); 4= To a great extent (32.6%); 5= To
a very great extent (17.1%)

ThreatSec

“To what extent do you perceive climate change to be an actual threat to
national security?” (1= Not at all (14.4%); 2= To a small extent (29.6%); 3= To
a moderate extent (35.3%); 4= To a great extent (13.8%); 5= To a very great
extent (6.9%)

4.45 (1.52)

3.30 (1.07)

2.69 (1.09)
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ResponEarth

“To what extent do you believe it is your responsibility to maintain and/or
improve upon the Earth and its natural resources for future generations?” (1=
Not at all (1.8%); 2= To a small extent (6%); 3= To a moderate extent (24%);
4= To a great extent (38.9%); 5= To a very great extent (29.3%)

3.88 (0.96)

Condition

1= Control (12.8%); 2= Public Health Frame Only (12.2%); 3= Morality Frame
Only (12.8%); 4= National Security Frame Only (12.8%); 5= Politicization
Only (12.2%); 6= Public Health Frame and Politicization (12.2%); 7= Morality
and Politicization (12.5%); 8= National Security and Politicization (12.2%)

N/A (N/A)

